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Macroeconomics and the Phillips Curve 
 
James Forder believes that neo-classical economists, following the work of Friedman and Phelps in 
the late 1960s, have misstated prior analytical work on the determination of wages and price 
inflation.  Thus Forder describes as myths three main stories, that “Phillips (1958) discovered a 
negative relation between inflation and unemployment”, that “policymakers treated it as offering a 
selection of inflation unemployment combinations from which they could choose”, and that, 
consequently, “inflationist policy was pursued until Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968a) 
revolutionized thinking” by developing the expectations-augmented analysis of the long-term 
vertical Phillips curve, (quotes from p. 1). 
 
He has pursued this exercise with academic zeal.  The bibliography runs from p. 253 to p. 300, 
around 1,000 references!  Of these probably most are criticized for sloppy thinking, especially those 
mentioned in the detailed notes, pp 219-251.  It is a lengthy, scholarly, and specialist book.  Those 
interested in the history of macro-economic thought will want to read it from cover to cover.  For 
the rest, the Introduction (pp 1-10) will probably suffice.  
 
The book is timely as well as controversial.  Recently, the traditional short-term downwards-sloping 
Phillips curve has seemed conspicuously absent.  The location of the natural rate of unemployment 
(NRU) has become a will-of-the-wisp.  We doubt whether we really understand the determinants of 
inflation, so a book that critically revisits earlier battles over such topics is welcome. 
 
How far does Forder succeed in his revisionist approach to these three issues, i.e. Phillips’ 1958 
contribution; the Phillips curve used for a trade-off; inflationism? 
 
On the first I found Forder rather convincing.  Phillips was not original in supposing and testing a 
negative relationship between the pressure of demand (or UE) and wages’ growth.  His originality lay 
in discarding all those other variables that those then working in the field had considered relevant, 
e.g. bargaining power, profitability, fairness, key bargains, etc., and in suggesting that his simplified 
(simplistic) relationship had been stable over a long run, implying that constant economic 
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relationships (laws) were more important than shorter-term politico-sociological influences.  That 
made the approach congenial to Lipsey, and later to Friedman, so the term, Phillips curve, became 
short-hand for the generalised treatment of inter-relationships between inflation  (however 
measured) and the pressure of demand (however measured), without much reference to the 
original article. 
 
Nor were other economists then working in this field unaware of the likely effects of current, or 
expected, inflation on wage demands.  What they largely failed to appreciate, however, was the 
acceleration argument, that if UE is kept below (above) the NRU, then inflation would go on rising 
(falling) indefinitely, (a prediction that failed – fortunately – in 2008-10).  There was some 
appreciation, prior to Phelps/Friedman, that the long-term Phillips curve might be steeper than its 
short-run version, but that is all.   
 
I am less persuaded by Forder’s latter two claims.  I recall that economists in the UK Civil Service in 
the 1960s were aware of the Phillips curve analysis, even though under Bretton Woods, the relevant 
trade-off in the UK was between growth and the Balance of Payments.  Moreover, no one argued 
that we should generate more inflation in order to raise growth, or lower UE.  Conversations were 
always the other way around, starting with the assertion that the (estimated) level of UE consistent 
with absolute price stability was (morally, politically, socially) unacceptable.  What was an 
acceptable level of UE was influenced by political priors.  If that target level of UE was such as to lead 
to a forecast of ‘reasonable price stability’, (see Chapter 5), then fine.  But if inflation would run 
higher, then the response was not to tolerate that, best to bring in a second instrument, i.e. incomes 
and prices policy. 
 
The opponents of the neo-classics were not inflationists; but they were, in the UK, advocates of 
incomes and prices policies.  The Phillips curve analysis, especially in its vertical, long-run variant, 
implies that incomes policies cannot work.  But it was not so much that analysis, but repeated 
practical failures of such policies that led to the dominance of the Phillips curve approach.  But if 
incomes policies do not work, neither is the Phillips curve determinate or stable.  So where does that 
leave macro-economics? 
 
